In recent years, food prices in Nigeria have risen much faster than other living expenses, putting families under intense pressure. Several reports from the National Bureau of Statistics and independent analysts indicate that many staple foods have become far more expensive, even when overall inflation was slightly eased. 

The rise in food prices has been traced to increased insecurity in farming areas, climate change (including erratic rainfall and flooding), higher transport costs, and more expensive farm inputs following fuel and exchange rate reforms. 

Rising food prices have a severe impact on the poorest households, as they allocate a significant share of their income to food. While food prices are decreasing in some areas of Anambra, this decline is pushing many smallholder farmers further into debt rather than improving household food security. This situation highlights a recurring pattern in Nigeria, where high production costs, reliance on informal credit, and weak market systems leave farmers vulnerable to price fluctuations at harvest time.

The Eastern Region and Anambra’s Experience

The rise in food prices has not been uniform across Nigeria, with the South-East experiencing some of the most significant increases in average food costs. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported in December 2024 that the South-East region was disproportionately affected by this surge, reflecting both structural supply issues and a heavy reliance on markets for staple foods.

In Anambra specifically, previous reports during the high-inflation period highlighted how traders and consumers struggled with the rising prices of basic items such as noodles and rice at major markets, including the Relief Market in Onitsha. 

For instance, a report by Premium Times quoted a trader in Onitsha who noted that the price of a carton of 70g noodles had soared from about ₦3,000 to between ₦7,000 and ₦8,000, while the price of a carton of 120g noodles had increased from around ₦4,500 to over ₦11,000 within a few years. While this reflected the consumer side of the crisis, subsequent developments have revealed a second, less visible shock: falling farmgate prices in some producing communities, including parts of Anambra, even as consumer prices remain high.

Understanding Food Pricing in Nigeria

Food pricing is shaped by the interaction of several layers: farmgate prices (what farmers receive), wholesale and transport margins, processing and packaging costs, and retail mark-ups faced by consumers. In efficient and competitive markets, prices along this chain reflect underlying costs (inputs, labour, fuel, storage, finance) plus reasonable margins for intermediaries, with some transmission from international to local prices for tradable commodities.

In Nigeria, however, research on food price volatility shows that structural bottlenecks, poor infrastructure, fragmented markets, weak storage, and limited market information distort this transmission. As a result, consumers can face very high prices in cities while farmers still receive relatively low prices at the farmgate, especially at harvest when supply is temporarily abundant, and smallholders are under pressure to sell quickly.

The Effects of Unstable Food Pricing on the Economy and Farmers

Food pricing has macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences:

• For the economy: Persistently high food inflation erodes real incomes, raises poverty, and fuels social tension, even when overall GDP is growing. The World Bank projects that Nigeria’s economy will expand by over 4% annually through 2027 but warns that elevated food prices remain a heavy drag on poor households. 
• For farmers and rural livelihoods: Smallholder farmers, who produce the bulk of Nigeria’s food, are vulnerable to both rising input costs and volatile output prices. When input prices (fertiliser, seed, fuel, labour) rise while farmgate prices stagnate or fall, farmers’ margins shrink, often forcing them into debt or compelling them to reduce production. Value chain assessments show that smallholders typically capture a small share of the final retail price due to weak bargaining power, limited storage, and dependence on middlemen who provide credit and market access on unfavourable terms.

How Smallholder Farmers Are Bearing the Brunt

Several factors explain why falling food prices hurt smallholders in Anambra and beyond instead of relieving them:

• Farmers depend heavily on expensive credit: Many smallholders rely on informal credit from local moneylenders, input dealers, or off-takers, often at high interest rates and on exploitative terms. 
• Production costs remain high despite lower output prices: Inputs such as seeds, fertiliser, agrochemicals, land preparation, and fuel continue to rise in naira terms, squeezing farmers even when output prices temporarily spike. 
• Farmers are forced to sell when prices are lowest: With little access to storage, processing, or structured markets, farmers typically sell immediately after harvest to meet debt obligations and household needs. 
• Market structures favour aggregators and urban traders: Value chain assessments highlight that aggregators and middlemen often provide short-term financing but set unfavourable buying conditions, including low farmgate prices at harvest. 
• Debt spirals and exit threats: Media and analytical reports warn that repeated seasons of low net returns are driving some farmers to consider abandoning farming altogether, raising the risk of a medium-term food supply crisis. 

The National Implications and Policy Gaps of Nigeria’s Food Pricing Crisis

The stress in Anambra is a microcosm of wider national fragilities in Nigeria’s food system. Research on food price volatility and farmer participation in government support schemes finds that better access to input subsidies and market information can reduce anxiety-driven price spikes and improve farmgate outcomes, but programme coverage and efficiency remain uneven.

Despite repeated policy statements and sectoral strategies, there remains a significant gap between high-level dialogue and concrete, field-level interventions that change the incentives for smallholders. 

Persistent challenges include:

• Limited affordable formal finance targeted at working capital for smallholders.

• Inadequate rural infrastructure (especially feeder roads, storage, and market facilities) keeps transaction costs high.
• Weak extension and market linkage systems that fail to give farmers timely information or collective bargaining power.
• Underdeveloped risk management tools, such as crop insurance and warehouse receipt systems.

Stakeholders and analysts warn that if smallholders continue to exit or reduce cultivated area due to unmanageable debt and poor price transmission, Nigeria could face renewed food crises even if short-term price dips temporarily ease pressure on urban consumers.

Respected voices in agricultural development have repeatedly warned that neglecting smallholder farmers in situations like the current one will worsen both rural poverty and national food insecurity. 

Over a decade ago, the then-president of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) cautioned G20 agriculture ministers that “neglect of smallholder farmers will compound food insecurity and food price volatility,” stressing that stable support for small producers is essential for a resilient food system.

More recently, global conversations about African agriculture have highlighted how investment flows tend to favour large agribusiness while leaving small-scale producers exposed. In a 2025 discussion on bolstering small-scale agriculture, IFAD President Álvaro Lario noted that “most of the poverty – 80 % – is actually in rural areas… in this subsistence farming,” emphasising that directing capital and policy attention to this “first mile” is crucial to drive growth and reduce poverty.​

At the Nigerian level, sector analysts echo similar concerns: A 2025 commentary on smallholder debt stresses that the disconnect “between policy dialogue and grassroots implementation has become one of the greatest barriers to genuine agricultural transformation in Nigeria,” with farmers “working tirelessly with minimal returns” while structural issues remain unresolved.

What Needs to Change

Evidence from research and practice points toward a set of actionable levers that could reduce the kind of distress currently seen among smallholders in Anambra:

• Strengthen targeted, affordable finance: Scale up accessible working-capital finance for smallholders tied to realistic repayment schedules, rather than reliance on high-interest informal credit.
• Improve market access and price transmission: Invest in rural roads, aggregation centres, and structured markets to enable farmers to reach more buyers, access better information, and secure fairer prices.
• Expand storage, processing, and risk tools: Support community or cooperative storage, basic processing, and risk-management instruments (like warehouse receipts and insurance) to reduce forced sales at low prices.
• Make support programmes more inclusive and effective: Strengthen and adapt schemes that provide inputs and market information (such as past growth-enhancement programmes), including by improving digital access and the proximity of registration points.

Without such reforms, the current episode of falling food prices in producing areas will continue to translate into rising distress among smallholder farmers, eroding livelihoods in Anambra and across Nigeria, even as the country seeks to stabilise its food economy.