Over the past four decades, Nigeria has implemented several agricultural policies, such as Operation Feed the Nation, the Green Revolution, the Back to Land Programme, the Cassava Development Initiative, the Agricultural Transformation Agenda, and the Green Alternative Policy.
These policies have been known to help address the many challenges facing the Agricultural landscape in Nigeria. A key component of one of them is the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme.
The Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) was launched by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on November 17, 2015, in Birnin Kebbi, Kebbi State.
The ABP was initiated under former President Muhammadu Buhari to directly link smallholder farmers and agro-processors (anchors) to boost domestic production of key agricultural commodities. The programme was designed to provide inputs in kind and funds for farm labour to smallholder farmers, enabling them to increase yields and a stable supply of raw materials.
Farmers repay the loan through produce upon harvest, which the anchor purchases at agreed prices. Eligible farmers were to be grouped into cooperatives of 5 to 20 members. The ABP included target crops and livestock such as rice, maize, wheat, cassava, yams, cocoa, oil palm, soybeans, tomatoes, poultry, fish, and others determined by the CBN.
How the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) Was Facilitated
The CBN provided funding through the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund at a 9% interest rate. The loans were disbursed by Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) like FCMB, and suppliers were paid directly. The Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) was charged with providing risk support and grouping farmers.
The Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC) was responsible for insurance coverage as necessary. Furthermore, anchors were accountable for organising farmers and providing technical assistance. For example, under the Nigeria Farmers’ Group & Cooperative Society (NFG-CS), cooperative members with FCMB accounts received support to cultivate between 1 and 5 hectares of land, which was farmed and managed under the NFG-CS.
Since its inception, the ABP reportedly disbursed over ₦1.1 trillion to approximately 4.67 million farmers cultivating crops such as maize, rice, and wheat. About ₦670 billion has been repaid, leaving an outstanding ₦450 billion.
In the north, farmers appreciated timely disbursement and provision of critical inputs like seeds, fertilisers, and chemicals, which facilitated the production of rice and maize. In 2019, maize farmer Madam Adenike Ogunjenrola from Ekiti state described ABP as transformative, citing that the programme improved farmers’ living standards and food security.
Nevertheless, the same year, Dr. Tunde Arosanyin, National Coordinator of the Zero Hunger Commodity Farmers Association, highlighted ABP’s direct impact on rural farmers but noted gaps in input quality and accessibility. Before 2019, over 27,000 farmers in the North East who were affected by the insurgency benefited from a ₦14.9 billion loan granted to NECAS. These testimonies reflect the programme’s potential to empower rural farmers and strengthen food security.
Despite recorded benefits, significant criticisms have emerged regarding the ABP’s effectiveness. In 2023, The Guardian reported that stakeholders and experts called for a complete program overhaul. Concerns centred on poor repayment rates, mismanagement, and lack of transparency.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that only 24% of the total loans had been repaid, while the CBN countered, claiming a 52.4% repayment rate. However, this dispute indicates underlying issues in monitoring and recovery mechanisms. In 2023, Rotimi Williams, CEO of Kereksuk Rice Farms, argued that loan approvals were politically influenced, leading to disbursement to unqualified recipients. He said large kickbacks, estimated at ₦280 billion, distorted the process and demotivated repayment.
The same year, Professor Simon Irtwange of the Yam Farmers and Marketers Association said their requests were denied despite being listed as eligible under the programme. Kabir Ibrahim of the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) criticised the CBN for bypassing farmer associations, which made tracking defaulters difficult. Implementation gaps were also linked to administrative inefficiencies.
For example, the absence of a clear operational manual left farmers unsure of procedures, mainly when deviations occurred. Environmental challenges, poor infrastructure, and elite resource capture further complicated implementation.
In addition to all this, the disbursement process was often problematic. According to RIFAN’s national treasurer in June 2023, some farmers were denied access to the full loan amounts, while others encountered difficulties due to complex banking procedures. Input distribution was inconsistent; some received fertilisers while others did not.
While some farmers like Malam Shehu Ibrahim in Kano praised the early disbursement of loans, others experienced obstacles at various stages. In many regions, smallholder farmers could not meet the minimum landholding requirement of 1–5 hectares, which excluded vulnerable groups, especially women, from participating. Studies by the World Bank and the African Development Bank have long shown that women in Nigeria face systemic barriers to land ownership.
Moreover, costs associated with registration and linkage to the Growth Enhancement Support database under the Agricultural Transformation Agenda created further hurdles. In some states, redundant registration processes reflected a lack of coordination and wasted public resources.
Stakeholders observed that more attention was given to disbursement and recovery than to ensuring sustainability. The loan fund’s revolving nature, a key component, was poorly managed.
In 2016, the Chief Executive of the Bank of Agriculture, Professor Danbala Danju, noted that commercial banks avoided the programme, deeming it unprofitable due to poor design and unclear economic projections. Despite good intentions, a lack of proper feasibility studies and poor implementation planning have undermined its potential.
The ABP model, linking farmers with offtakers and providing subsidised inputs, is not inherently flawed. Many countries have used similar models to increase productivity and reduce post-harvest losses. However, the ABP’s implementation lacked the rigour and transparency required for such a capital-intensive initiative.
The lack of a strong monitoring framework, limited farmer education, political interference, elite capture, and administrative bottlenecks contributed to the programme’s underperformance. Although the ABP has been discontinued, there are valuable lessons. Going forward, agricultural interventions in Nigeria must emphasise transparency, include marginalised groups, and incorporate precise mechanisms for sustainability and evaluation.
A well-implemented model could still bridge the gap between production and processing, stimulate rural economies, and move Nigeria closer to self-sufficiency in food production. However, for this to happen, future policies must be grounded in data, including real farmers, and shielded from political interests.
