Fertiliser subsidies have long been promoted as a solution to low agricultural productivity in Nigeria. They work by reducing the cost of inputs so that smallholder farmers can use more fertiliser, accrue higher yields, and improve food security.
The real test of a subsidy is not how many bags of fertiliser are distributed, but whether it permanently shifts a farmer’s productivity curve. In Nigeria, the success metric must evolve from short-term yield bumps to long-term soil health, market competitiveness, and farmer independence.
Sadly, the reality of these subsidies is far more complex. While they have provided some benefits, significant gaps still must be addressed.
Government-subsidised fertiliser schemes were introduced to help smallholder farmers afford inputs and improve productivity. In some cases, these programmes have expanded access to fertiliser, especially in areas where private markets are weak or non-existent.
However, distribution has often been marred by poor targeting. Large-scale farmers, political elites, and intermediaries frequently benefit more than the poor rural farmers for whom the subsidies are meant. As a result, the poorest farmers often remain underserved.
Modest crop yield increases have been recorded in regions where subsidised fertiliser has reached its target users. Particularly in Northern Nigeria, where state governments actively support fertiliser programmes, farmers have reported better harvests for crops like maize and rice.
However, these gains are not consistent across the country. In the south, fertiliser access remains limited, and yields remain stagnant in many areas. The imbalance shows that location-specific strategies may be more effective than a one-size-fits-all subsidy policy.
One common misconception is that simply using more fertiliser guarantees better yields. However, soil quality, irrigation, crop variety, and farming techniques also play significant roles. In areas with poor soil health or inadequate water supply, fertiliser alone offers minimal benefit.
Without investments in extension services, infrastructure, and research, Nigeria’s agriculture’s long-term productivity will remain limited, regardless of how much fertiliser is subsidised.
While subsidies can stimulate input use in the short term, they often discourage private investment in the fertiliser market. When government procurement dominates the supply chain, private dealers struggle to compete. This weakens long-term market development and discourages innovation.
Inconsistent government policies, such as abrupt subsidy withdrawals or erratic price controls, continue to deepen this uncertainty, making private sector involvement riskier.
Subsidy programmes are expensive. Nigeria has sometimes spent more on fertiliser subsidies than capital investments in agriculture (such as irrigation, storage, and rural roads).
This imbalance has serious consequences. Nigeria’s fertiliser subsidy approach often chases seasonal output at the expense of generational infrastructure. Roads, storage, and irrigation are productivity multipliers; however, fertiliser works best when these foundations are in place. Every naira spent without them is a yield ceiling waiting to happen.
Although subsidising fertiliser may deliver short-term political or economic wins, it limits funding for long-term improvements that could transform the sector more sustainably.
Since the 1970s, Nigeria’s fertiliser subsidy policy has shifted between full, partial, and zero subsidy regimes. These frequent changes confuse farmers, distort input markets, and reduce the programme’s overall impact.
A farmer who receives a subsidy this season cannot reliably plan for the next. The resulting uncertainty undermines both productivity and trust in public agricultural initiatives.
Despite decades of subsidy programmes, Nigeria’s fertiliser use is still well below the African and global averages. Nigeria uses an estimated 9.4 kg/ha, less than half of Africa’s average (21 kg/ha) and far below the global average (over 100 kg/ha).
This suggests that the subsidy policy, though expensive, has not achieved its complete objective of significantly increasing national fertiliser application rates.
Countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have coupled fertiliser subsidies with aggressive extension services and rural road building, increasing fertiliser adoption rates. Nigeria’s experience shows that subsidy spending risks becoming an expensive but stagnant line item in the budget without such complementary measures.
One major weakness of past subsidy schemes is the lack of proper targeting. Electronic vouchers, farmer identification systems, mobile delivery platforms, and other technologies can help ensure subsidies reach the intended beneficiaries.
When subsidies are better targeted, they are more likely to improve productivity and reduce rural poverty. Without this, leakage to unintended beneficiaries will continue to dilute the policy’s impact.
Targeting should be about who gets the subsidy, how and when they receive it. Smart subsidies could be linked to soil-test results, climate data, and farmer performance records.
Fertiliser subsidies are most effective when combined with other policy tools. These include investments in soil testing, irrigation, farmer education, and access to quality seeds.
Conditional cash transfers, subsidised loans, or other social protection mechanisms can also sustainably enhance productivity. Rather than overrelying on fertiliser subsidies, Nigeria must adopt a more holistic approach to agricultural transformation.
Rather than abolishing fertiliser subsidies outright, policymakers should focus on redesigning them to become smarter, more transparent, and outcome-driven. Subsidies should reward productivity gains, support ecological sustainability, and empower smallholder farmers. Clear goals, transparent implementation, and regular monitoring will help these programmes achieve their intended impact.
Fertiliser subsidies in Nigeria are not inherently bad. They have helped some farmers access crucial inputs and supported national food strategies. However, they are not a comprehensive solution to agricultural challenges. The absence of targeted approaches, stable policy frameworks, and necessary complementary investments can make subsidies inefficient and costly.
Nigeria’s fertiliser policy needs a redesign, not a eulogy. The goal should be subsidies that sunset over time, replaced by resilient markets, informed farmers, and sustainable soils. In this model, the best subsidy is one that a farmer no longer needs.
